Key takeaways
- In a Kyodo News telephone poll on November 14 and 15, 59.0% said the government's response to the run of cyberattacks on companies was slow. 32.7% said it was quick.
- Since October, the government has warned companies, convened ministries, compiled an emergency package with about ¥10 billion, and set up a nationwide police investigation. But many of the package's measures are due in 2027, and the two teams promised for November had not been announced as of November 16.
- In our view, "slow" misses the main point. This year's breaches happened inside private companies' systems, where a government has few direct levers. Its strongest ones, the privacy regulator's formal powers, have been used sparingly: in April to September, zero recommendations and zero orders.
- That limit also explains the digital minister's call in October for people to "protect your own information yourselves", which drew criticism online. With few tools against the companies that leaked the data, the message fell back on the people whose data was leaked.
The poll#
Kyodo News asked people how they rated the government's response to the cyberattacks on companies. 59.0% said it was slow; 32.7% said it was quick. The same poll put support for Prime Minister Takaichi's cabinet at 50.4%. Only the headline results have been published in the reports we could read; we have not seen the exact question or the other answers.
What the government has done#
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| Oct 1 | The active cyber defense law takes effect: designated critical infrastructure operators must report incidents, and police gain powers against attacking servers |
| Oct 6 | The digital minister asks the public to stop reusing passwords, turn on multi-factor authentication and beware of phishing |
| Oct 8–9 | Ministries meet; the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) and other agencies warn companies. See our government response article |
| Oct 26 | The Prime Minister orders an emergency package |
| Oct 30 | The NCO opens a special website listing help lines and warnings |
| Oct 28 | The privacy regulator, the PPC, publishes a draft revision of its security guideline, with comments until November 27 |
| Nov 2 | IPA strengthens its help line for people whose data leaked |
| Nov 5 | The NCO issues technical guidance against the kinds of intrusion seen this year |
| Nov 6 | Ministers compile the emergency package, with about ¥10 billion from reserve funds; police set up a nationwide joint investigation of this year's large breaches |
What is still to come#
Much of the package is dated months ahead:
| Due | Measure |
|---|---|
| November 2026 | An NCO outreach team to contact organizations at risk, and an IPA "top-gun" penetration testing team. Neither had been announced as of November 16 |
| End of 2026 | Threat hunting manuals and tools; measures against domestic devices used as stepping stones; a police reporting window for cyber damage |
| January 2027 | The PPC's revised guideline is to take effect; IPA's supply chain observation network |
| By March 2027 | The public-private "cyber rescue team" secretariat; guidance on moving away from uploaded ID photos |
| April 2027 onward | An NCO analysis unit, which would produce cross-case analysis and a Japanese list of exploited vulnerabilities |
| No date | An amendment to the cyber response law, which the Prime Minister asked ministers to study |
Why the government's tools are limited#
Look at where this year's breaches happened: an email delivery vendor's servers, a furniture retailer's member system, a securities firm's contractor, a hiring platform's analytics tool. In every case, the systems belonged to a private company, and only that company could patch them, restrict access to them or delete the data in them.
The government's direct levers over those companies are few:
- The privacy regulator can demand reports, give guidance, recommend and, in the end, order. In the first half of fiscal 2026 it demanded reports 43 times and gave guidance 200 times, but issued no recommendations and no orders, and made no on-site inspections of businesses, according to its draft half-year report. Its new security guideline will only take effect in 2027, and even then its examples are examples, not rules.
- The active cyber defense law imposes reporting duties only on designated critical infrastructure operators. Most of this year's victims, such as retailers, SaaS vendors and app operators, are not designated.
- The police investigate after the fact, and the attackers are often abroad. Their new power to neutralize attacking servers had not been used as of mid-November; the takedowns announced so far relied on Google's and Microsoft's lawsuits in the US.
- Everything else in the package is support and information: teams that offer help, manuals, lists, warnings. They work only if companies use them.
"Protect your own information yourselves"#
On October 6, Digital Minister Furukawa told a press conference that cyberattacks are "not only a problem for companies and organizations". He asked people to stop reusing passwords, turn on multi-factor authentication and reach services through official apps and websites, and to "be conscious of protecting your own information yourselves". According to Shukan Josei PRIME, the remark drew criticism on social media, along the lines of: if companies cannot protect our data, how can we, and will the state not protect us?
The advice itself was sound; we give the same advice. But the framing put the burden on the people whose data had been leaked, by companies they could not control. In our view, it was the clearest sign of the problem this poll reflects: when the government has few tools against the companies, its message turns to the public.
Our view#
"Slow" is not quite the word. "Limited" is closer. A government cannot patch a retailer's server, review a vendor's code or delete data a company should not have kept. The breaches of 2026 happened where its reach is shortest. Faster ministerial meetings would not have prevented any of them. Japanese voters are right to be dissatisfied, but the gap is mostly in what the state can make companies do, not in how quickly it holds meetings.
Use the levers that exist. The privacy regulator's formal powers, recommendations, orders and on-site inspections, went unused in the first half of the year. Guidance given privately does not change other companies' behavior. In our view, a few public recommendations in the clearest cases of failure, such as data kept long after its purpose ended or admin access with no restrictions, would do more than another round of warnings.
Say plainly what the state can and cannot do. Individual advice is useful, but it should come with a clear statement of what companies owe their customers and what the government will require of them. "Protect your own information" invites the question "and who protects it when they hold it?" The answer should be the companies, under rules the government enforces.
What this means for readers#
- For companies in Japan: expect the PPC's guideline examples to become the benchmark in investigations from 2027, and do not wait for the date. See our guideline article.
- For people whose data leaked: the practical steps are still yours to take, unfortunately. Our breach notice guide covers each kind of data.
- For observers: the dates to watch are the November teams, the end-of-year manuals and the January 2027 guideline. We track them in our weekly reviews.
Japanese terms at a glance#
| Japanese | Reading | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 世論調査 | yoron chōsa | Opinion poll |
| 政府対応 | seifu taiō | Government response |
| 緊急対策パッケージ | kinkyū taisaku pakkēji | Emergency countermeasures package |
| 勧告 | kankoku | Recommendation (formal, by a regulator) |
| 命令 | meirei | Order |
| 立入検査 | tachiiri kensa | On-site inspection |
| 自分の情報は自分で守る | jibun no jōhō wa jibun de mamoru | Protect your own information yourself |