Key takeaways
- The paper password notebook sold by the ¥100 shop chain Daiso is short of stock. Sales have risen week by week since late October, when Japan's breach disclosures surged, Daiso told ITmedia.
- Japan's information security agency, IPA, says it does not reject paper. It recommends a different password of about 15 characters for every service, and multi-factor authentication or passkeys wherever offered.
- In our view, paper is now a reasonable way to keep passwords, for one reason: it makes it practical to stop reusing them, and reuse is what turns one company's breach into break-ins at others, as at MUJI and the Takarakuji lottery site this month.
- What paper cannot do is just as important. It does not stop phishing, a password stolen from the service, or a session or token taken from the service's own systems, as at Yumil Link and, it appears, Qoo10. Passkeys handle the first; only the services can handle the rest.
What happened#
Daiso, which sells most goods for ¥100 or a little more, has sold a paper notebook for writing down IDs and passwords since autumn 2020. It was aimed at older people and others uncomfortable managing passwords on a device. From about the end of October, sales began to rise every week, by an amount that "surprised even the developer", Daiso told ITmedia NEWS. It did not give figures. The notebook is short of stock, and Daiso plans to restock in November. It says the reassurance of paper that is not connected to any network is attracting attention again.
The timing matches the wave of breach notices. According to MM Research Institute, publicly disclosed breaches caused by cyberattacks rose from 72 in August and 81 in September to 193 in October. Leaked login IDs and passwords reached a cumulative 161 million by the end of October, about 31 times the 5.14 million of all of 2025. Our own list of 2026's largest breaches now has 68 entries.
What IPA says#
IPA, the government-affiliated agency that runs Japan's information security help line, told ITmedia that its view has not changed since 2022: it does not necessarily reject paper. Its recommendations, also on its own website, are:
- A different password for every service, about 15 characters long, mixing upper and lower case letters and digits
- Password managers are fine for those who can use them, ideally a trustworthy service with good support
- A notebook you carry around can be lost or read over your shoulder
- Turn on multi-factor authentication (SMS codes, an authenticator app or a hardware key) or passkeys wherever a service offers them
- Treat unexpected emails and SMS as scams by default, and do not open their links
IPA also points out the limit of anything you do at home: your ID and password are stored by the service too, and if they leak from there, your notebook cannot help.
What each habit protects against#
Different habits stop different attacks. This is our summary, based on how these attacks work in general and on this year's cases:
| Threat | Example this year | Paper notebook | Password manager | SMS or app codes | Passkeys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A password leaked from one service is tried on others (credential stuffing) | MUJI's online store, the Takarakuji site | Helps, if every password is different | Helps | Helps | Helps |
| A fake login page collects your password | Card and bank phishing after every breach | No | Partly: autofill does not fill in on a lookalike domain | No: codes can be passed on to the real site | Helps: a passkey only works on the real site |
| Your password leaks from the service itself | Many breaches on our list | No (but a unique password limits the damage to that one service) | No (same) | Helps: the password alone is not enough | Helps: there is no password to leak |
| A session or token is taken from the service's systems after you log in | Yumil Link's stolen sessions; Qoo10 invalidated tokens that may have been misused | No | No | No | No |
| The record itself is lost or seen | A risk, especially if carried | Depends on the master password | — | — |
Two points stand out. Every habit helps against reuse, the attack driving this month's break-ins. And none of them helps against the last kind of attack, where the service itself loses the proof that you already logged in. That one is the service's job.
Qoo10: when the key is not the password#
The online marketplace Qoo10, run by eBay Japan, said on November 12 that a third party accessed its systems on November 6 and viewed personal data, including addresses with map coordinates and physical characteristics that customers had entered. It says it has found no evidence that payment data or passwords leaked. It also says it invalidated every authentication token that may have been issued or used without authorization, and forced the affected accounts to log out. It has not said how many customers are affected.
Tokens and sessions are what a service gives you after you log in, so that you do not have to log in again on every page. If an attacker can make or take them, your password, wherever you keep it, is not involved. We explained how that works in our Yumil Link article.
Our view#
Writing passwords down used to be mocked. Today it is a fairly sound habit. The advice against it dates from a time when the main worry was someone at the next desk reading a note stuck to a monitor. The threat that matters now is remote and at scale: one service leaks millions of passwords, and attackers try them everywhere else. Against that, a notebook kept at home that lets you use a different password for every service is far better than one memorable password reused across all of them. It is not the best option, but it is a reasonable one, especially for people who will not use a password manager.
The notebook solves the user's half of the problem; passkeys remove it. A notebook makes unique passwords practical. A passkey removes the password altogether: there is nothing to write down, nothing to reuse, nothing a fake site can collect and nothing to leak from the service. Where a service offers passkeys, they are the better answer. Where it offers only SMS or app codes, those still stop credential stuffing, though not phishing.
The rest is the services' job. The run on notebooks shows that people want to protect themselves. But a notebook cannot stop a session stolen from a server, an admin screen with no IP restriction or data that should have been deleted years ago. Japanese services that want their users to stop worrying should offer passkeys, protect what happens after login, and keep less. Until they do, a notebook in a drawer is not the weak point.
What readers can do#
- Use a different password for every service. A notebook kept at home, or a password manager, makes that practical.
- Do not carry the notebook, and do not keep a photo of it on your phone.
- Turn on passkeys where offered; otherwise multi-factor authentication.
- After a breach notice, change that password and any others where you reused it. Our guide to breach notices covers each kind of leaked data.
- Treat emails and SMS that arrive after a breach as scams by default, and log in through the app or a bookmark, not a link.
What this means for practitioners#
- Offer passkeys. Your customers are buying notebooks because they are worried about passwords. Remove the password where you can.
- Rate-limit and watch logins. Credential stuffing uses valid passwords; detect it by volume, source and failure patterns. MUJI says its defences against it were not enough.
- Protect sessions and tokens. Short lifetimes, binding to the device, and fresh authentication for sensitive actions. Be ready to invalidate every token at once, as Qoo10 did.
- Tell customers what to do, specifically. "Change your password" helps less than "change it here and anywhere you reused it, then turn on passkeys".
Japanese terms at a glance#
| Japanese | Reading | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| パスワード管理ノート | pasuwādo kanri nōto | Password notebook |
| 使い回し | tsukaimawashi | Reuse (of a password) |
| リスト型攻撃 | risuto-gata kōgeki | Credential stuffing |
| 多要素認証 | ta-yōso ninshō | Multi-factor authentication |
| パスキー | pasukī | Passkey |
| 認証トークン | ninshō tōkun | Authentication token |
| 品薄 | shinausu | Short of stock |