Key takeaways
- On November 6, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asked her cyber minister to study amending Japan's active cyber defense law to strengthen the government's ability to gather intelligence on attacks targeting Japan. She also asked for a way for the government to see and analyze suspicious traffic to private companies, not just to government bodies, "referring to the examples of major countries".
- The ruling LDP wants the review to cover communications that stay inside Japan. The current law excludes them because of the constitutional secrecy of communications. The government can analyze only traffic with a foreign link, and even that part has not started: it takes effect by November 2027.
- Digital Minister Toshiharu Furukawa, asked on November 10, said the study is only beginning. He noted that the operational issues of the cross-border part are "not yet known".
- In our view, there is a real gap at the last hop: attackers relay through hijacked devices and residential proxies in Japan, and that traffic looks domestic. But it is a narrow one, and the cross-border part should be tested first. The faster gains are in the parts of the package that work with consent: dispatching experts, sharing information, and letting companies opt in.
What the current law allows#
Japan's active cyber defense law lets the government acquire communications data in two ways, according to the Cabinet Office's explanation:
| Route | Traffic covered | Conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Without consent | Traffic passing through Japan from abroad to abroad, and traffic between Japan and abroad involving foreign equipment suspected of being used in attacks | Only where other methods would be very difficult; prior approval of an independent oversight commission; automatic selection of "mechanical information", such as IP addresses and commands, not the content of communications; the rest deleted immediately |
| By agreement | Traffic of critical infrastructure operators and other users that sign an agreement with the government | Voluntary; the government analyzes the part coming from abroad and returns results to the operator |
Communications between two points in Japan are outside both. Japanese media call them "domestic-domestic" (内内) communications. The government's own explanation for that line was practical as well as legal: even when the source of an attack looks domestic, tracing it usually leads to stepping stones abroad, and most attacks originate abroad.
These provisions take effect on a date set by cabinet order, no later than November 22, 2027. The parts of the law in force since October 1 cover incident reporting by critical infrastructure operators, information sharing and police powers against attacking servers.
What has been asked for#
| Date | Who | What |
|---|---|---|
| Oct 20 | LDP | An emergency proposal asks the government to consider using domestic communications data where foreign-related data is not enough |
| Nov 6 | Prime Minister | Asks the minister to study amending the law to strengthen intelligence gathering, and to study a way for the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) to see and analyze suspicious traffic to private companies |
| Nov 9 | LDP | Starts concrete study toward an amendment, including domestic communications. Former digital minister Masaaki Taira, who heads the party's cybersecurity headquarters, points to domestic devices hijacked from abroad and used to attack other domestic devices, and says it is debatable whether Japan can respond while that traffic remains a "black box" |
| Nov 10 | Minister Furukawa | The study "is only now beginning"; other options include adding members to the public–private council |
| Nov 13 | Minister Furukawa | Meets industry groups and asks for help with a scheme to dispatch public and private experts to victims, and for attack information |
According to ANN, the government and the ruling party want to submit an amendment to the 2027 ordinary Diet session at the earliest, and will proceed carefully because of the secrecy of communications. Nothing has been drafted: there is no text, and the Prime Minister did not say which countries' examples she means.
Where the gap is real#
Taira's point has evidence behind it. Criminals in Japan already hide behind residential proxies: home devices, often cheap streaming boxes, that relay other people's traffic. The National Police Agency found them in about 44% of online banking fraud cases in 2024, and the research institute NICT has seen up to about 27,000 IP addresses a day acting as proxy exits in Japan, as we described in our article on the police takedowns.
To a company's server, an attack relayed that way arrives from a Japanese home connection. The traffic between the proxy and the victim is domestic, so even after 2027 the government will not see it. It can see the leg from abroad to the proxy only if that leg involves foreign equipment already under suspicion. Finding and cleaning up those devices in Japan is exactly the kind of work the law's police powers were meant for, and it is where visibility into domestic traffic would help most. The government's emergency package already promises measures against domestic stepping stones by the end of the year.
The question of order#
The cross-border part of the law has not run for a single day. The oversight commission has not yet inspected any acquisition of communications data, because none has happened. The minister himself says its operational issues are unknown. Extending the law to its most sensitive category, communications between people and companies inside Japan, before the first part has been tested would put the hardest step first.
National monitoring is most valuable for seeing the same attacker hit many victims and warning the next one. That only works if what the government sees comes back to companies quickly, and the emergency package's analysis unit does not start until April 2027.
There is also a route that needs no new intrusion into privacy. The law already lets the government sign agreements with critical infrastructure operators and other users to receive their traffic, although it analyzes only the part from abroad. The Prime Minister's request for a way to see "suspicious traffic to private companies" could be built on the same principle: companies that choose to share, in return for analysis they can use.
Our view#
The gap Taira describes is real, but it is narrow. Domestic stepping stones are a genuine blind spot, and they matter most for fraud and botnets. If an amendment comes, it should be tied to that purpose, limited to the same mechanical information as the current law, and overseen by the same commission. It should not become a general power to watch domestic traffic.
Seeing more is not the same as fixing more. As we argued when the poll found that most people think the government is slow, its main weakness in this breach wave is that it has few means to make companies fix the systems attackers get into. Wider monitoring of traffic does not change that, and the emergency package itself blames missing basic measures for most of the damage.
Do the consent-based parts first, and make them fast. Dispatching experts to victims, gathering attack information from industry, and agreements that let companies opt in to monitoring can all start without touching the Constitution. Then publish how the cross-border analysis works once it starts. If those do not close the gap, the case for going further will be stronger, and easier to make in public.
What this means for practitioners#
- Nothing changes yet. There is no draft, and the existing communications provisions start by November 2027.
- Watch the opt-in routes. The public–private council, agreements to share traffic data and the expert dispatch scheme are where companies outside critical infrastructure can take part.
- Treat domestic source IPs with suspicion. Residential proxies mean an attack can arrive from an ordinary Japanese home connection; blocking foreign IPs is not a defense.
- Fix the basics the package lists. Patching, inventories of internet-facing systems, data minimization and key management are still the defenses that matter most, whatever happens to the law.
Japanese terms at a glance#
| Japanese | Reading | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| サイバー対処能力強化法 | saibā taisho nōryoku kyōka-hō | The active cyber defense law (common name) |
| 内内通信 | nainai tsūshin | Communications within Japan |
| 外内通信 / 内外通信 | gainai / naigai tsūshin | Communications from abroad into Japan / from Japan to abroad |
| 外外通信 | gaigai tsūshin | Communications passing through Japan from abroad to abroad |
| 通信の秘密 | tsūshin no himitsu | Secrecy of communications (Constitution, Article 21) |
| 機械的情報 | kikaiteki jōhō | Mechanical information (IP addresses, commands; not content) |
| 当事者協定 | tōjisha kyōtei | Agreement with the government to share traffic data |
| 踏み台 | fumidai | Stepping stone (hijacked relay device) |
| 官民サイバー救援隊 | kanmin saibā kyūentai | Public-private cyber rescue team |