Key takeaways

  • On September 24, 2026, an expert panel convened by Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) proposed a new police power called "remote analysis" (遠隔解析). Police would access phones used by criminal groups remotely and copy messages from encrypted apps such as Signal and Telegram.
  • The stated target is Japan's anonymous, loosely organized crime rings (匿流, tokuryū) behind record fraud and a wave of violent robberies. But the proposed legal trigger is broader: crimes believed to involve several conspirators, with no requirement that they form an ongoing group.
  • Safeguards include a judge's permit in every case, NPA-designated specialist officers, deletion of data outside the permit, notification of the phone's user afterward, and after-the-fact review by public safety commissions.
  • The panel met five times in about six weeks and had an outline of its proposal by its third meeting. For a power this intrusive, that is fast.
  • On October 16, 2026, the cabinet approved a bill and submitted it to the Diet, three weeks after the proposal. It keeps the judge's permit, deletion and notification, says the power must not be treated as a criminal investigation power, and also extends it to the Self-Defense Forces in certain operations. It does not list the crimes covered, and has no review or sunset clause.

Update, October 17: The cabinet approved the bill on October 16 and submitted it to the Diet. See The bill.

What was proposed#

Japan's fraud and robbery rings recruit "disposable" low-level members over social media and direct them through encrypted messaging apps. When police arrest the person who makes the call or breaks into the house, the organizers and the next targets usually remain unknown. The panel's proposal notes that fraud losses hit a record of about ¥325.7 billion in 2025.

End-to-end encryption means that even a cooperating messaging provider cannot hand over message content. The panel's answer is to go to the device itself.

How remote analysis would work, according to the proposal:

  1. Police identify a phone believed to be used by the offenders, for example through victim reports, undercover operations or information from former members.
  2. Specialist officers apply to a judge for a permit, specifying the device and the information to be obtained.
  3. With the permit, officers access the device remotely, check its contents, copy the information needed, and delete anything the permit does not cover.
  4. Information such as the next target's name and address, the planned time, and the roles and weapons of the offenders goes to the officers responsible for preventing the crime, through patrols, warnings to potential victims and similar measures.

The proposal describes remote analysis as a one-time acquisition of data stored on the device, not continuous interception of communications. It also says the information obtained may later be used in criminal proceedings, through the procedures of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The safeguards#

Safeguard What the proposal says
Strict requirements A high probability of serious crime damage, urgency, and no other way to get the information quickly (補充性). Limited to devices used for communication among offenders or with victims
Judicial review A judge's permit required in every case, before access
Who does it Only officers with specialist skills, designated by the NPA Commissioner General. Separate from the officers who act on the information
Data handling Copy only what the permit allows. Delete everything else
Notification The user of the device is notified afterward, once doing so no longer jeopardizes the operation
Oversight Every case reported to the relevant public safety commission, which can check it and instruct police to correct problems

During its deliberations, the panel was briefed on the United Kingdom's Investigatory Powers Act and on Germany's Code of Criminal Procedure and the Bavarian police law.

Why the Police Duties Execution Act#

The panel chose to frame remote analysis as a power to prevent crime, not to investigate it. So the proposal would place it in the Police Duties Execution Act (警察官職務執行法), which governs what police may do to prevent harm, rather than in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning is that police often need to act before a crime has legally been committed, and a prosecution-focused procedure would not prevent enough harm.

This is the same act that, from October 1, gives police the power to access and neutralize computers used in cyberattacks, under the new Article 6-2 that we covered in our Active Cyber Defense explainer. If remote analysis is added, the Police Duties Execution Act would become the legal home of two separate powers for police to enter other people's devices over the network.

Our view#

Aimed at tokuryū, written more broadly#

For people in Japan, the most important question is whether this power will stay limited to the groups it is sold as targeting.

The proposal's own wording suggests it may not. It says the power should cover "damage from crimes believed to be committed through a conspiracy of several people". It also says, explicitly, that the law should not require the offenders to have an ongoing association. That is deliberate: tokuryū are loose, shifting networks, and a requirement tied to organized crime groups would miss them. But it also means the legal trigger is not defined as "tokuryū" at all. Any "serious crime" involving several conspirators could, in principle, qualify.

Two more details point the same way:

  • Which crimes count as "serious" is not yet defined. The proposal speaks of "certain serious crimes" without a list.
  • The threshold is set at the level of an ordinary search and seizure. The panel says it does not need the stricter standard of "sufficient reason" required for wiretapping. For a power that involves breaking into a phone, that is a notable choice.

None of this means the power will be misused. But once a power exists in law, its scope is decided by its wording, not by the problem that justified it. When a bill appears, the points to watch are:

  • Whether the covered crimes are listed exhaustively
  • Whether there is a review or sunset clause
  • Whether police must publish annual statistics on how often the power is used, and against what

Six weeks to a proposal#

The panel's schedule, from the NPA's own records:

Date (2026) Meeting
August 10 1st meeting: open discussion of issues
August 26 2nd meeting: briefing on UK and German systems
September 2 3rd meeting: outline of the proposal presented
September 9 4th meeting
September 24 5th meeting: proposal adopted

An outline was on the table 23 days after the first meeting. For comparison, the 2016 expansion of Japan's wiretapping law came out of a Legislative Council subcommittee that deliberated for about three years.

The urgency is real. Fraud losses are at record levels, and violent robberies directed over encrypted apps have shocked the public. Still, a proposal to let police break into phones, which the panel's own report says may involve exploiting device vulnerabilities or deceiving users, deserves more than six weeks of discussion. The speed leaves the impression that the conclusion was set before the panel began. Whether or not that is fair, it makes a careful, public Diet debate all the more important.

The bill#

Added October 17, 2026.

On October 16, the cabinet approved a bill amending the Police Duties Execution Act, and the government submitted it to the Diet, 22 days after the panel adopted its proposal. The NPA has published the full text. It adds two articles.

Article 8: a duty to protect people at risk. When a serious crime, defined as one that endangers life or body or may cause serious damage to property, has been committed or attempted, and there are specific facts showing that harm will spread or that the same offenders will commit a similar crime, police must take steps to protect the person at risk, if that person has been identified.

Article 9: "damage prevention computer investigation" (被害防止電子計算機調査), the formal name for remote analysis:

What the bill says
Who Officers designated by the NPA Commissioner General as "damage prevention computer investigators", separate from the officers who protect potential victims
What Connect over a network to a computer, including a phone, reasonably believed to be used by offenders to communicate with each other or with victims, and copy the data needed to protect the person at risk: their name and address, when the crime is planned, and similar details. Officers may take the actions needed to connect and copy
When All three must apply: the crime appears to involve several conspirators; there is an urgent need; and the information is extremely difficult to get quickly any other way
Permit A judge's permit in advance, from a district or summary court, on an application stating the target device, the data to be copied, and the specific actions and procedure to be used
Other data Anything outside the permit may not be passed on, and must all be erased when the operation ends
Notification The device's user is notified of the device, the crime, the permit and the data taken, except where the user cannot be located or notice is otherwise difficult. Notice may be delayed while it would undermine the protective measures
Oversight Every operation reported to the relevant public safety commission, which checks it and can order corrections
Not an investigation power "The powers … must not be interpreted as having been granted for the purpose of criminal investigation"
In force Within six months of promulgation

Two parts of the bill go beyond what we described from the panel's proposal:

  • No criminal investigation. The panel's proposal said the data could later be used in criminal proceedings through the Code of Criminal Procedure. The bill instead states that the power must not be treated as a criminal investigation power. It does not say what happens if data obtained this way is later offered as evidence.
  • The Self-Defense Forces. Japan's SDF Act already applies parts of the Police Duties Execution Act to SDF personnel in public security and defense operations. The bill amends those provisions so that they also cover the new Articles 8 and 9. That is a significant extension that the panel's proposal did not discuss, and we have not seen it explained.

Against the points we said to watch:

What we said to watch In the bill
Covered crimes listed exhaustively No. "Serious crime" is defined by its effect: danger to life or body, or serious damage to property
A review or sunset clause None in the bill text
Annual statistics on use None in the bill text. Oversight is through reports to public safety commissions

In our view, the bill keeps the safeguards around each operation, permits, erasure and notice, but adds none around the power as a whole. Without a list of crimes, a review date or published numbers, the Diet and the public will have no regular way to see how far it reaches beyond tokuryū.

For the security community: vulnerabilities#

The proposal openly anticipates that remote analysis may require exploiting vulnerabilities in devices or deceiving the user, and records the view that police should be allowed to do so. It says the specific techniques must stay highly confidential. It also says the police must be able to show afterward that the data really came from the target device.

Update, October 17: The bill requires the permit application to state "the specific content and procedure" of the actions to be taken, so a judge will see how each device is to be accessed. It does not address how techniques or vulnerabilities are handled beyond that.

What it does not discuss is what happens to the vulnerabilities themselves. There is no mention of whether police would report the flaws they use to vendors, or of any process like the US government's Vulnerabilities Equities Process for deciding when to disclose. A police force that keeps unpatched vulnerabilities in widely used phones leaves everyone else exposed to them. That should be part of the debate when the bill is drafted.

What happens next#

The bill was submitted to the Diet on October 16, according to the NPA and Kyodo News. It now goes to committee in the House of Representatives. If it passes, the new powers take effect on a date set by cabinet order within six months of promulgation. We will update this article as it moves through the Diet.

Japanese terms at a glance#

Japanese Reading Meaning
遠隔解析 enkaku kaiseki "Remote analysis". Proposed police power to access offenders' devices remotely
匿名・流動型犯罪グループ（匿流／トクリュウ） tokumei ryūdō-gata hanzai gurūpu (tokuryū) Anonymous, loosely organized crime groups
警察官職務執行法 keisatsukan shokumu shikkō-hō Police Duties Execution Act
許可状 kyokajō Permit issued by a judge
公安委員会 kōan iinkai Public safety commission (civilian police oversight body)
数人の共謀 sūnin no kyōbō Conspiracy of several people