Key takeaways

  • IDC Frontier (IDCフロンティア), a data center and cloud company owned by SoftBank, has confirmed that a ransomware attack took down part of its IDCF Cloud from about 03:40 on October 7, 2026.
  • 495 companies and local governments that use IDCF Cloud are affected, the company says.
  • The attack hit four zones of East Japan Region 1, based at a data center in Shirakawa, Fukushima, according to Nikkei. Customers' services hosted there are down, including the websites of Ibaraki Prefecture and the Ibaraki Prefectural Police, according to SoftBank as reported by Kyodo News.
  • In its third report on October 8, IDC Frontier said customer data in those four zones was unlikely to be retrievable or restorable. In its fifth report on October 14, it said snapshot backups were safe after all, and can be retrieved for the 194 affected customers who used IDCF Cloud's snapshot function. The other 301 still depend on their own backups.
  • The fifth report also says IDC Frontier found no trace that data in customers' virtual servers was viewed or taken out, and that it judges no data leaked. Separately, the account details of 48 customers in the IDCF Cloud Portal, including login IDs and password hashes, were improperly viewed.
  • No unauthorized access has been found in IDCF Cloud's other zones and regions, but the management console is still suspended everywhere, and customers there are being asked to back up their own data. On October 18, IDC Frontier resumed its IDCF Cloud Backup service so they can do that, including restoring to other clouds or on-premises. The snapshot function is still suspended.
  • In its final report on October 27, IDC Frontier said the attackers got in through a vulnerability in open-source software in the customer portal's login system, then gained administrator rights over the virtualization platform. It has not named the software or said who the attackers are. It has reported the attack to its supervisory ministry and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, and says it has had no contact with the attackers and paid nothing.
  • JR East and its card unit View Card say an email delivery service they use was affected, and that email addresses and other data for up to about 6.09 million records may have been viewed or taken. It is the first disclosure of a possible data leak linked to the attack. JR Kyushu said the same of up to about 1.3 million email addresses of its web members. On October 15, after IDC Frontier's finding, JR Kyushu and JR Central said no leak was confirmed. JR East and View Card had not updated their notices that evening.
  • Low-cost airline Peach Aviation says its booking email system, holding about 1.89 million records of passengers' names, contact details and itineraries, ran on the affected region. It says no leak has been confirmed.

Update, October 27: IDC Frontier's seventh and final report says the attackers got in through a vulnerability in open-source software used by the login system of the IDCF Cloud Portal, then took administrator rights over the virtualization platform and encrypted customers' virtual servers. It again found no data taken, says backups can be retrieved for 206 customers, and found that portal account details of up to 71 customers were improperly viewed. See The final report.

Update, October 7 (evening): IDC Frontier's second report confirms a ransomware attack affecting 495 companies and local governments. We have also added more customers that have named IDCF Cloud as the cause of their outages. See The second report and Who is affected.

Update, October 8 (morning): No third report yet. Jiji Press reports that IDC Frontier is preparing an alternative environment, and the Asahi Shimbun reports that Ibaraki Prefecture was told the cause was a "power failure". See What IDC Frontier told reporters and Two notices in one day.

Update, October 8 (evening): IDC Frontier's third report says customer data in four zones of East Japan Region 1 is unlikely to be recoverable, and that customers can restore only from their own backups. See The third report.

Update, October 18: IDC Frontier's sixth report says it has resumed its IDCF Cloud Backup service after confirming it is safe. Customers in the unaffected zones and regions can now take backups and restore them outside IDCF Cloud. The snapshot function remains suspended. See The sixth report.

Update, October 15: JR Kyushu and JR Central say that, based on IDC Frontier's investigation, no leak of personal data was confirmed for their customers. JR Kyushu will email the 1.3 million members it had warned. JR East and View Card have not updated their notices. See The fifth report.

Update, October 14: IDC Frontier's fifth report says it found no sign that data was taken from customers' virtual servers, and that snapshot backups can be retrieved for 194 of the 495 affected customers. It also says the portal account details of 48 customers were improperly viewed. IDC Frontier also told ITmedia that it has seen several images matching the attacker's message shown on its console. Nissui expects its logistics unit to be back to normal next week, on a new system outside IDC Frontier. See The fifth report, The unverified details and Frozen food in the queue.

Update, October 13: JR Central says email and order details for about 15,000 customers of two online shops may have been viewed or taken through an email delivery service hosted on IDCF Cloud. Department store Takashimaya had said on October 9 that its newsletter contractor used IDCF Cloud, but that no leak had been confirmed. See JR Central and Takashimaya.

Update, October 11: Low-cost airline Peach Aviation says its booking email system ran on IDCF Cloud, holding about 1.89 million records, but that no leak has been confirmed. Separately, IDC Frontier changed the FAQ we cited on its hypervisor versions on the evening of October 11: it now lists ESXi 8.0.3 for all regions, where the July version listed 6.7 or 8.0.3. See Peach Aviation and An out-of-support hypervisor.

Update, October 9: JR East and View Card say data for up to about 6.09 million records held by an email delivery service may have been viewed or taken. E-commerce platform FutureShop says the mail servers for two of its email services, which held recipient addresses and parts of email bodies, were on IDCF Cloud. IDC Frontier's fourth report describes its response setup with SoftBank. JR Kyushu has since reported up to about 1.3 million email addresses. See Possible data exposure and The fourth report.

What is IDCF Cloud?#

Outside Japan, IDCF Cloud is not well known. Inside Japan, it is one of the main domestic alternatives to AWS, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud, aimed at companies and public bodies that want their systems run by a Japanese provider in Japanese data centers.

Operator IDC Frontier Inc., wholly owned by SoftBank Corp. It was part of the Yahoo Japan group from 2009 and rejoined the SoftBank group in 2018. In April 2026 it transferred its data center business to SoftBank and now focuses on cloud services
Service IDCF Cloud, launched in October 2014, building on public cloud services the company has offered since 2009. It describes the service as one of the largest Japanese-run clouds, with 15 zones across East and West Japan
What it offers Virtual machines, dedicated hardware, managed databases and load balancers, and a dedicated private cloud built on VMware technology. The smallest virtual machines start at a reference price of about ¥560 a month
Hypervisor VMware ESXi. According to IDC Frontier's FAQ, as of July 2026, East Japan Regions 1 to 3 ran ESXi 6.7 or 8.0.3, and West Japan ran 8.0.3, with upgrades "in progress". On October 11, the FAQ was changed to list 8.0.3 for all regions "as of October 2026"
Data centers Run by SoftBank, including Shirakawa (Fukushima), Kitakyushu (Fukuoka) and Fuchu (Tokyo)
Certifications ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27017. Since January 2024, IDCF Cloud (compute, load balancers, managed databases, DNS, GSLB and containers), IDCF Private Cloud and IDCF Cloud Bare Metal Server have been registered under ISMAP, the Japanese government's security assessment program for cloud services, roughly comparable to FedRAMP in the US. Central government ministries and agencies are in principle expected to procure cloud services from the ISMAP list

Its customers include online services, media companies and, according to Nikkei, local governments and the public sector. The affected East Japan Region 1 is one part of this footprint.

What IDC Frontier has said#

IDC Frontier's notice, published on October 7, is short:

When About 03:40, Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Where East Japan Region 1 of IDCF Cloud
Cause Unauthorized access by a third party
Status Part of the service is down. The company is investigating, and checking the safety of areas not affected

Affected customers are being contacted individually. IDCF Cloud has three regions in East Japan and one in West Japan, according to ITmedia. Only one is named as affected.

The second report#

Later on October 7, IDC Frontier published a second report with much more detail:

Cause A ransomware attack by a third party
Affected 495 companies and local governments that use IDCF Cloud. Each has been contacted individually
Status Ongoing since about 03:40 on October 7
Done East Japan Region 1 cut off from the network and its systems shut down, to prevent secondary damage and data leakage
In progress Identifying and blocking the intrusion route
In progress Checking the safety of other regions. The management console that customers access from outside, for regions other than East Japan Region 1, is suspended until it is confirmed safe

The report does not say whether customer data was taken, how the attackers got in, who they are, or whether a ransom has been demanded.

It does not give a recovery date either. Customers say they have not been given one: Medialink says restoration work is under way at SoftBank but there is "no prospect of recovery" yet, and UD Talk says the latest report from IDCF is that there is currently no prospect of recovery.

What IDC Frontier told reporters#

Jiji Press adds two details that are not in the published reports:

  • After the ransomware attack, a shutdown process ran automatically from the cloud management platform, according to the company. The report does not make clear whether this was a protective mechanism or part of the attack itself.
  • While it works to identify the intrusion route, IDC Frontier is hurrying to prepare an alternative environment. It has not said whether customers' systems will be moved there, or what data they will be able to bring with them.

IDC Frontier published its third report on the evening of October 8.

The third report#

Added October 8, 2026.

The third report narrows down where the damage is, and gives customers in that area the news many had feared:

Affected area Four zones of East Japan Region 1: tesla, henry, pascal and joule
What happened Virtual servers stopped, and cannot be restarted
Affected customers 495 companies and local governments, contacted individually
Customer data Data stored in the four zones is unlikely to be retrievable or restorable. "At present, in our view, data can be restored only from backup data held by customers themselves"
Customers in the four zones Advised to prepare a separate environment and rebuild there, "in view of the current damage and from a security standpoint", and to restore data from their own backups. The report does not say who provides that environment
Other zones and regions East Japan Region 1's radian and newton zones, East Japan Regions 2 and 3, and West Japan Region 1: no unauthorized access confirmed. Customers are being asked to back up their data themselves, and IDC Frontier is sending instructions on how
Management console Still suspended in all regions. Until it returns, IDC Frontier is starting and stopping customers' virtual servers on their behalf on request
Investigation Working with an outside security company on the networks, servers and storage of both the East and West Japan regions. The intrusion route is still being identified
Reports Reported to its supervisory ministry and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department
Not affected IDCF Cloud TypeS (formerly White Cloud ASPIRE) and IDCF Private Cloud

The report still does not say whether customer data was taken, who the attackers are, or whether a ransom has been demanded. It gives no date for the management console to return.

The fourth report#

Added October 9, 2026.

IDC Frontier's fourth report, on October 9, describes how it is organized. It set up an emergency response headquarters at 09:00 on October 7 and is working closely with its parent, SoftBank:

  • Customer support, through SoftBank's corporate division: guidance on backup procedures, proposals for a migration environment, and starting and stopping customers' virtual servers on their behalf, on request
  • Investigation and recovery, led by IDC Frontier's technical division with support from SoftBank's, and with an outside security company
  • Reporting and consultation with its supervisory ministry, the police and other bodies

The fourth report does not say which customers each measure is for. Reading it together with the third report, the backup guidance and the starting and stopping of servers appear to be for customers in the unaffected zones and regions, who were asked to back up their own data while the management console is down. Virtual servers in the four affected zones cannot be restarted, and those customers were told to rebuild in a separate environment and restore from their own backups. Who the migration environment proposals are for is not stated.

The fifth report#

Added October 14, 2026.

IDC Frontier's fifth report, on October 14, covers three things: whether data was taken, whether backups survived, and improper viewing of customer account data in its portal.

Data in customers' virtual servers In the four affected zones, IDC Frontier and an outside security company found no trace that data stored in customers' virtual servers was viewed or taken out, and no misuse or other secondary damage so far. "We have concluded that no data leaked outside"
What was checked The intrusion route; access, authentication and operation logs; files and settings the attackers placed and the processes they ran; and traces of data being taken out of customers' virtual servers
Snapshots IDC Frontier now says the backup data is safe. Of the 495 affected companies and local governments, the 194 that used IDCF Cloud's snapshot function can have their backup data retrieved. Whether it can be restored, and how it will be handed over, is being discussed with each customer
IDCF Cloud Portal The portal customers use to start virtual servers and check bills: the registration details of 48 customers were improperly viewed. IDC Frontier found no trace that they were taken out
What was viewed in the portal Company name, portal login ID, portal login password stored as a hash that is "hard to reverse", the corporate email addresses that receive contract and server notices, and the total monthly fee. For two companies, one email address each may include a person's name
Other zones and regions No service impact. Still being checked "to confirm safety". IDC Frontier is preparing an easier way for those customers to back up their data

Two parts of this change the picture.

Backups. On October 8, IDC Frontier said data in the four zones was unlikely to be retrievable, and that customers could restore only from backups they held themselves. Six days later, it says the snapshots survived. That is good news for 194 customers, though "retrievable" is not yet "restorable", and it leaves 301 customers who did not use snapshots with nothing from IDCF Cloud to restore. It also sits uneasily with the attacker's claim, in the images described below, to have destroyed 554,153 snapshots. IDC Frontier has not commented on that figure.

"No data leaked." This is IDC Frontier's judgment, based on finding no traces. It is not the same as proof that nothing was taken, and the report does not say how far back its logs go. It also puts IDC Frontier at odds with its customers: JR East, View Card, JR Kyushu and JR Central all said they cannot rule out that data in their email delivery services on IDCF Cloud was viewed or taken. As of the afternoon of October 14, none of them had updated its notice. In our view, the customers' statements reflect what they knew at the time, not a contradicting finding; whether they withdraw or keep them now is the next thing to watch.

Update, October 15: Two of them have now withdrawn. JR Kyushu says it received IDC Frontier's report on October 14 that no leak of personal data was found, and that on that basis no leak was confirmed for the roughly 1.3 million email addresses of its web members. It will email them to say so; its newsletter remains suspended until it has rechecked security. JR Central says its email contractor reported the same for its two online shops. Both base their conclusion on IDC Frontier's investigation, not on one of their own. JR East and View Card, with about 6.09 million records between them, had not updated their notices as of the evening of October 15.

The portal finding is new. It is the first time IDC Frontier has said that customer account data was viewed, and it involves login credentials, even if hashed. The report does not say who viewed it, how the portal was accessed, or whether this was how the attackers got in. If you are one of the 48 customers, changing the portal password and checking for other places the same password is used is a sensible step, whatever the hash strength.

"Data restoration is difficult"#

Some customers are now saying their data may not come back from IDCF Cloud at all. According to ITmedia:

  • UD Talk said on its official X account that IDCF Cloud had told it that "restoring the data is difficult". It plans to rebuild its service on another cloud and restore from the data it holds itself.
  • SKIMA, an online commission marketplace for illustrations, said recovery had at one point looked "very difficult", but that it later confirmed some usable data remained. Recovery will take time.

IDC Frontier's third report then confirmed this publicly for the four affected zones: data there is unlikely to be recoverable, and customers can restore only from backups they hold themselves. Its fifth report partly reversed it: snapshots can be retrieved for the 194 customers who used them.

Possible data exposure: JR East, View Card, JR Kyushu and FutureShop#

Added October 9, 2026.

On October 9, JR East, one of Japan's largest railway companies, and its credit card unit View Card became the first IDCF Cloud-linked companies to say customer data may have been viewed or taken. In both cases, the affected system is an external email delivery service they use to send emails to members. Neither names the service.

Service Records (maximum) Data that may have leaked
Ekinet (えきねっと), JR East's online train booking service About 1.67 million Email address. Business Ekinet members are not included
Otona no Kyujitsu Club (大人の休日倶楽部), JR East's membership club for travelers aged 50 and over About 390,000 Email address, member number, credit card expiry date, date of birth
VIEW's NET, View Card's member website About 4.03 million Email address. View Card says it is still identifying who is affected. Cards with the "ii" mark and corporate cards are not included
JR Kyushu Web members (JR九州Web会員), JR Kyushu's online membership About 1.3 million Email address. Names, addresses, phone numbers, card numbers and newsletter contents were not affected. October 15: no leak confirmed, based on IDC Frontier's investigation
JR Tokai Market and Iimono Tanbo, JR Central's online shops (added October 13) About 15,000 Email address, and order emails' contents: name, address, phone number, order and delivery details. October 15: no leak confirmed, according to its contractor
Total About 7.40 million as first announced; about 6.09 million after JR Kyushu's and JR Central's updates Overlap between the services is not known

JR East says it cannot rule out that "electronic mail log data and other data, including some customers' email addresses", was viewed or taken. Both companies say names, addresses, phone numbers and credit card numbers were not exposed. Member emails from the three services are partly unavailable. JR Kyushu, which runs Kyushu's railways in western Japan, made a similar announcement the same day: its email newsletter for JR Kyushu Web members cannot be sent, and it cannot rule out that "electronic mail log data including some customers' email addresses" was viewed or taken. Its wording closely matches JR East's, but neither company names its email delivery service, so we do not know whether it is the same one. JR East and View Card will email affected customers, and View Card warns that they may receive suspicious emails.

This matters beyond the numbers. At the time, IDC Frontier had said data in the four zones was unlikely to be recoverable, but had not said whether any data was taken. JR East and View Card, as customers of a service hosted on IDCF Cloud, said they could not rule it out. On October 14, IDC Frontier said it found no trace of data being taken and judges that none leaked (see The fifth report). The JR companies had not updated their notices as of that afternoon.

FutureShop (フューチャーショップ), whose futureshop platform is used by online stores in Japan, has described a similar case in more detail. The mail servers (MTAs) for two of its optional services, future Scenario Cast for marketing emails and futureCartRecovery for abandoned-cart reminders, ran on IDCF Cloud. It says they held part of the data used to send emails: recipient email addresses, sender information and parts of email bodies, which can include customers' names, birthdays and member IDs.

It also says that data was deleted automatically 14 days after sending and encrypted from the time it was stored. Because IDC Frontier has not said when the intrusion began, FutureShop cannot yet say which period of data may have been affected. Addresses, phone numbers, passwords and card data were not on IDCF Cloud, and the main futureshop platform runs elsewhere.

FutureShop stopped both services on October 7, built a new email environment in a different data center, and resumed sending on October 9, about two days later. It stresses that resuming service does not mean its investigation into a possible leak is finished. Update, October 16: In a third report on October 15, FutureShop said that, based on IDC Frontier's findings, no data leaked from the two services. Unlike JR Kyushu and JR Central, it added a check of its own: its service developer confirmed that IDC Frontier's investigation covered the environment where its mail servers ran, and found no suspicious activity on the connection route to them. Limiting how long data is kept and encrypting it at rest will not stop an attacker from taking files, but they can, in principle, limit how much data is exposed and how usable it is.

JR Central and Takashimaya#

Added October 13, 2026.

JR Central (JR東海), which runs the Tokaido Shinkansen, said on October 13 that customer data from two of its online shops, JR Tokai Market and Iimono Tanbo, may have been viewed or taken. Their emails are sent by an outside company that uses IDCF Cloud. The data covers about 15,000 records: email addresses, plus what the shops' emails contained, including names, addresses, phone numbers, order details and delivery addresses. Card data and passwords are not included. JR Central reported to the Personal Information Protection Commission the same day, has moved its email sending to another environment, and says no actual leak has been confirmed. Its wording, that it cannot rule out that data was viewed or taken, matches JR East's and JR Kyushu's. On October 15, JR Central added that its contractor had reported, based on IDC Frontier's investigation, that no leak of personal data was confirmed.

Department store Takashimaya (高島屋) had said on October 9 that the contractor sending newsletters for its online store, its TBEAUT beauty site and its Takashimaya Fashion Square site used IDCF Cloud. The data held there included online members' email addresses, names, dates of birth, postcodes and addresses down to city level, and Fashion Square members' email addresses. Takashimaya said that as of October 9, no leak had been confirmed, and gave no number. Newsletters are suspended; order emails are still being sent.

A pattern is emerging. JR East, View Card, JR Kyushu, JR Central and Takashimaya all say their customer data was exposed through an email delivery service run by a contractor on IDCF Cloud, and Peach ran its own email system there. None has named the contractor, so we do not know whether it is one company or several.

Peach Aviation#

Added October 11, 2026.

Peach Aviation (ピーチ), the Osaka-based low-cost airline that flies domestic and international routes, said on October 9 that the attack stopped or delayed its email system, including the servers that send itineraries. Itinerary emails for new bookings were delayed or not delivered. Peach began sending the delayed emails from alternative servers on October 8.

System Email delivery system on IDCF Cloud, East Japan Region 1
Records in the system About 1.89 million
Data Email address, name in the Latin alphabet, phone number, booking number and itinerary
Not stored there Credit card and passport data
Leak "Not confirmed at this time"

The wording differs from JR East's and JR Kyushu's. They say they cannot rule out that data was viewed or taken. Peach says only that no leak has been confirmed, and Aviation Wire stresses that the 1.89 million figure is the size of the affected system, not a number of records confirmed leaked. For that reason we have not added Peach to our list of the largest breaches. Peach says it received IDC Frontier's first investigation report on October 9, was told the affected servers had been isolated, and has confirmed no impact on its other systems. It has reported to the Civil Aviation Bureau, and flights were not affected.

In our view, a booking number, a name and an itinerary are what a convincing fake "flight change" or "refund" message needs. If any of this data did leave, it would be useful for targeting travelers, including foreign passengers.

Who is affected#

IDCF Cloud is used by businesses and, according to Nikkei, by local governments and the public sector. IDC Frontier has not named any customers.

These are the sites and services we have found affected so far, sorted by how firmly the link to IDCF Cloud has been confirmed:

Organization What stopped Link to IDCF Cloud
Ibaraki Prefecture Official website, from about 04:00. Application forms could not be downloaded Confirmed by SoftBank, according to Kyodo News
Ibaraki Prefectural Police Official website, from about 10:00. Information on driver's license renewal unavailable Confirmed by SoftBank, according to Kyodo News
Greenwich Online store tools Rakuraku Zaiko, Rakuraku Saiyasu Koshin and Ultra ASP: inventory syncing and price updates stopped Confirmed by the company, which names the IDCF Cloud outage in its notice
Medialink Cloud phone services DX Denwa, MediaVoice Cloud, MediaCalls and MediaOffice: outside calls and admin logins unavailable Confirmed by the company
Fuva Brain Cloud management consoles for its security products, including Eye"247" Work Smart Cloud and SafetyZone Confirmed by the company
UD Talk (Shamrock Records) Functions of the speech-to-text accessibility app, including publishing transcripts Confirmed by the company
SKE48 Mail All services of the idol group's fan messaging app Confirmed by the operator
Net Assist Servers of its hosting customers unstable or unreachable Confirmed by the company
FutureShop Email services future Scenario Cast and futureCartRecovery for online stores using futureshop: stopped October 7, resumed October 9 from a different data center. Recipient addresses and parts of email bodies were stored on IDCF Cloud Confirmed by the company
JR Kyushu Email newsletter for JR Kyushu Web members, through an external email delivery service. Up to about 1.3 million email addresses may have been viewed or taken; on October 15 it said no leak was confirmed Confirmed by the company, which names IDC Frontier
JR Central Emails from its online shops JR Tokai Market and Iimono Tanbo, through an external email delivery service. About 15,000 records may have been viewed or taken; on October 15 it said no leak was confirmed Confirmed by the company, which names IDC Frontier
Takashimaya Newsletters for its online store, TBEAUT and Takashimaya Fashion Square, sent by a contractor. Members' names, emails, birth dates and partial addresses were held there; no leak confirmed as of October 9 Confirmed by the company, which names IDCF Cloud
Peach Aviation Itinerary emails for new bookings delayed or not delivered; sending resumed from alternative servers on October 8. About 1.89 million records in the system; no leak confirmed Confirmed by the company, which names IDC Frontier
JR East and View Card Member emails for Ekinet, Otona no Kyujitsu Club and VIEW's NET, through an external email delivery service. Data for up to about 6.09 million records may have been viewed or taken Confirmed by the companies, which name IDC Frontier
Six Apart Movable Type Cloud: 31 servers in East Japan Region 1. Admin screens and customers' published websites unreachable Confirmed by the company
SKIMA Commission marketplace for illustrations Reported by ITmedia among companies affected by the outage
Nissui Logistics (subsidiary of seafood and frozen food maker Nissui) Receiving and shipping at its low-temperature warehouses, which handle frozen food and other goods Confirmed by the company. Nissui's second report, on October 9, names IDC Frontier. Some receiving and shipping resumed on October 9, and the affected servers held no personal or customer information managed by the Nissui group. On October 14, it said it is building a new system on servers outside IDC Frontier and expects all sites to be back to normal next week
Ibaraki Prefectural Assembly, Kodaira City (Tokyo), Adachi Ward (Tokyo), Tobu Zoo Websites unavailable on October 7 Not confirmed. They did not name a provider, according to ITmedia. Jiji Press also lists Kodaira and Tobu Zoo among the sites that went down, without saying they use IDCF Cloud
Jiji Press (news agency) Its websites could not be viewed or updated, according to its own report Not confirmed. Jiji lists itself among the affected sites in its report on IDC Frontier, but does not say it uses IDCF Cloud
Shimizu S-Pulse, Kyoto Sanga F.C. (J.League football clubs) Websites unavailable on October 7 Not confirmed. They cited a problem at their "server management company" without naming it
Japan Basketball Association, Radio Kansai, capsule hotel Anshin Oyado, JRA-VAN World (overseas horse racing information) Websites or related systems unavailable on October 7. JRA-VAN World says all services stopped from about 03:40 Not confirmed. They did not name IDCF Cloud, according to ITmedia
Karaoke Pasela Website and related systems Not confirmed. Its X account blamed "a major domestic cloud server" outage centred on East Japan, without naming it
Badminton Association of Japan Official website unavailable Not confirmed. It says some systems of "the cloud service company it uses" were accessed by a third party, but does not name the company, according to Nikkan Sports

Matsumoto City, whose website also went down that day, attributed its outage to an external translation service, so it may be unrelated.

The list shows how far one cloud region reaches: a prefectural government and its police, business phone lines, security product consoles, an accessibility app for deaf and hard-of-hearing users, online retailers' back-office tools, a fan app and, it appears, a cold-chain warehouse operator, all down from the same early-morning attack. These are only the customers that have spoken publicly. IDC Frontier says there are 495.

The unverified details#

Images shared on social media, presented as the attacker's, show messages such as "IDCF CLOUD INFRASTRUCTURE SEIZED" and "YOUR CLOUD IS OURS". According to Security Taisaku Lab, they claim that:

  • 239 hypervisors were reached
  • 225 of 225 datastores were encrypted
  • More than 16,600 virtual machine disks were affected
  • More than 550,000 snapshots were destroyed

According to ITmedia, the message is dated October 7 and also claims that the whole of East Japan Region 1 was encrypted in seven minutes, that IDC Frontier's staff had not noticed it seven hours later, that 3.6 PB of primary storage was encrypted and 41.5 PB of backup capacity lost. It tells IDC Frontier's operators to connect to the VMware ESXi hosts and read a file the attackers left there.

IDC Frontier has confirmed that this was a ransomware attack. Asked by ITmedia on October 9, it said it has seen several images that appear to match what was displayed on the IDCF Cloud console in the affected area. It did not confirm the figures, saying that the ransomware attack, "including what is written" on the screen, is still under investigation. Its fifth report, which says snapshots survived for 194 customers, is hard to square with the claim that over 550,000 snapshots were destroyed. No ransomware group has been named, no ransom demand has been seen, and as of October 14 we found no listing on ransomware leak site trackers. We are not reproducing the images.

The sixth report#

Added October 19, 2026.

IDC Frontier's sixth report, on October 18, is short. It resumes the IDCF Cloud Backup service, which it had suspended after the attack, saying its safety has been confirmed.

The service is for customers whose virtual servers are still running: those in the other zones of East Japan Region 1 (radian and newton), East Japan Regions 2 and 3, and West Japan Region 1. IDC Frontier had asked them to back up their data as a precaution, and in its fifth report said it was preparing an easier way to do so. With the backup service back, it says, they can get their backup data quickly and restore it to cloud environments other than IDCF Cloud, or on-premises.

The snapshot function is still suspended while its safety is checked. The report says nothing new about the four affected zones, the intrusion route, the attacker or the management console.

In our view, the detail worth noting is the restore destination. IDC Frontier is now giving customers a way to hold a copy of their data outside its own platform, which is the point we make in Snapshots are not backups if they live in the same place.

The final report: an open-source flaw in the portal's login system#

Added October 27, 2026.

On October 27, IDC Frontier published its seventh report, saying its investigation with an outside security firm is complete.

How the attackers got in. The entry point was the IDCF Cloud Portal, the web portal customers use to start virtual servers and check their bills. Attackers exploited a vulnerability in open-source software used in the portal's authentication system and got into it. From there, through the management console, they obtained administrator rights over the virtualization platform, stopped customers' virtual servers in four zones of East Japan Region 1, and encrypted the virtual servers themselves. IDC Frontier does not name the software or the vulnerability.

What was taken. It found no trace that data inside customers' virtual servers was taken out, in the affected zones or elsewhere, and no misuse. In the portal itself, the registration details of up to 71 customers were improperly looked up, including names or email addresses that may contain names for up to 31, and the login passwords of up to 4 customers had been changed by the attackers; those have been reset. It found no trace of the portal data being taken out.

Recovery. Backup data can now be retrieved for 206 of the 495 affected customers, up from 194. IDC Frontier says it has had no contact with the attackers and has neither negotiated nor paid.

What changes. IDC Frontier has set up an independent security organization, will scan open-source software for vulnerabilities on a fixed schedule using SoftBank's patching service, and will keep a company-wide software inventory (an SBOM) that is matched automatically against vulnerability information. The portal stays offline until it is rebuilt in a new environment, with all server credentials changed, its login system replaced by an external identity provider, and access limited to customers' IP addresses with multi-factor authentication required.

In our view, the most important line is the chain from the portal to the hypervisor. A customer-facing login system was one step away from administrator control of the whole virtualization platform. That is the same pattern we see in this month's email delivery service breaches: the attackers reached the provider's own management layer, and from there everything it runs for its customers. The fixes IDC Frontier lists, an external identity provider, IP restrictions and MFA on the portal, are good, but the question for every cloud provider is whether a compromise of the customer portal should ever lead to admin rights over the platform underneath.

What we don't know yet#

IDC Frontier has not said:

  • Which open-source software and vulnerability were exploited, and when the vulnerability became known
  • How far back its logs reach, and so how confident its finding of no data leak is. JR Kyushu and JR Central have accepted it; JR East and View Card had not updated their notices as of October 15
  • Who is behind the attack. It says it has had no contact with them
  • How many virtual machines are affected, and whether the retrieved snapshots can actually be restored
  • What the migration environment it is proposing to customers is, and whether customers in the four affected zones can rebuild there
  • When the management console and the snapshot function will return

Our analysis#

When the cloud provider is the victim#

For IDCF Cloud's customers, this is an incident they cannot fix themselves. Their applications may be well run, but if the provider's infrastructure is down, so are they, and they depend on the provider for information about their own data. Greenwich, for example, says it is still checking the scope of the impact on its own services.

That is the same pattern we saw this week with Scala Communications, where one breach at a software vendor reached several client companies, and with Asahi Kasei Therapeutics, whose website was breached through its operator. Here the shared layer is the cloud itself.

Snapshots are not backups if they live in the same place#

IDC Frontier now says that data in the four affected zones is unlikely to be retrievable or restorable, and that customers can restore only from backups they hold themselves. In other words, whatever copies existed inside IDCF Cloud in those zones cannot, for now, be counted on. That is the scenario every cloud customer should plan for.

Six Apart, which runs its Movable Type Cloud blogging and website service partly on IDCF Cloud, shows the difference this makes. Its notice says customer backups were taken before the outage and are stored on an IaaS platform separate from IDCF Cloud, and that it is preparing to restore its 31 affected servers from them. Compare that with UD Talk's account that data restoration from IDCF Cloud is "difficult".

IDC Frontier's own FAQ for IDCF Cloud is clear about who is responsible for backups. It tells customers that they must back up their virtual machines' data themselves, and that VM data and backup data are within the customer's area of responsibility. It also describes snapshots and templates as suitable for keeping VM data, because they are stored on physically separate hardware from the volumes attached to the virtual machines. Separate hardware, though, is still inside the same provider's platform. Snapshots and backups kept in the same provider and region as the systems they protect can be lost along with them. Attackers who reach the virtualization layer, as in the Osaka Metropolitan University attack this week, look for backups first. At least one copy of important data should be kept somewhere the provider's infrastructure cannot reach, such as another provider or an offline copy.

Update, October 14: IDC Frontier's fifth report says the snapshots did survive, and can be retrieved for the 194 customers who used them. That is better than its earlier assessment, but it does not change the lesson. For a week, customers were told not to count on those snapshots, and how they will be restored is still being worked out. Customers with their own copy outside IDCF Cloud, like Six Apart, could start restoring on day one.

Two notices in one day#

IDC Frontier's first notice said only "unauthorized access". Within the same day, its second report named ransomware, gave the number of affected customers (495), and explained what it had done: cutting the region off, and suspending the management console for other regions as a precaution. That is faster and more concrete than many Japanese disclosures we have covered.

What customers were told did not always match. According to the Asahi Shimbun, Ibaraki Prefecture said that SoftBank, which provides its website service, explained the outage as "a power failure at a data center" in the cloud. As of 20:00 on October 7, the prefecture said it had not been told whether ransomware was involved, hours after IDC Frontier had said so publicly. The prefecture also said the data on its website includes no personal information.

The third report, a day later, answered the question customers needed most urgently: data in the four affected zones is unlikely to come back. The gap that remains is whether their data was taken. Until IDC Frontier says, every one of the 495 customers has to plan as if it was. JR East and View Card, two days after the attack, became the first customers to say publicly that they cannot rule it out.

Frozen food in the queue#

The Nissui Logistics outage could reach well beyond Nissui. The company runs 17 cold storage and distribution centers with about 400,000 tons of capacity, and describes itself as storing goods entrusted by its customers and running distribution centers for manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, convenience stores and restaurant chains. When a cold storage warehouse cannot receive or ship, frozen and chilled goods cannot simply be moved elsewhere, and food supply chains that run on tight schedules back up quickly.

Japan saw this in July. A ransomware attack on Nichirei, whose cold-chain logistics business serves about 5,000 customers a year, disrupted its warehouse operations from July 13 until normal operations resumed on July 24, about 11 days later. KFC Japan, which relied on Nichirei for deliveries, said about 90% of its items were delayed. Nissui Logistics has not said how many customers it serves, and is likely smaller in that respect. How far the impact spreads will depend mostly on how long the outage lasts. On October 9, two days after the attack, Nissui said some receiving and shipping had resumed, and that it would announce when full operations could be restored. On October 14, it said it was rebuilding the system on servers outside IDC Frontier, and expected all Nissui Logistics sites to return to normal operation the following week, roughly two weeks after the attack, compared with Nichirei's 11 days. Update, October 20: All 17 sites returned to normal receiving and shipping on October 20, 13 days after the attack. Nissui says it will strengthen security and risk management including its outside contractors, and prepare for faster recovery when systems fail.

An ISMAP-registered cloud#

IDCF Cloud is on the list of cloud services assessed under ISMAP, the program central government agencies use to choose cloud providers. ISMAP is often described as Japan's counterpart to FedRAMP in the United States: providers are audited against a government-defined set of security controls, drawn from the ISO/IEC 27000 series, Japan's unified government security standards and NIST SP 800-53, and approved services are listed for agencies to buy from. The ISMAP registration rules require a registered provider to report an incident that could seriously affect users to the program's operating body, with a preliminary report within about three working days of becoming aware of it and a full report within about 30 days. The program can request more information and carry out monitoring. A registration is suspended only if the provider fails to report when asked, and any suspension is shown on the public ISMAP list. So the attack itself does not take IDCF Cloud off the list; whether its listing changes is worth watching.

Local governments such as Ibaraki Prefecture are not bound by the ISMAP procurement principle, so we do not know whether ISMAP played any part in their choice of IDCF Cloud.

There is no indication that IDC Frontier failed to meet ISMAP's requirements. But this case illustrates a point we have made about ISMS and Japan's new supply chain security rating: an assessment or certification shows that a provider met defined requirements when it was evaluated. It is not a guarantee against being breached, and customers still need their own plan, including backups, for the day their provider is hit.

An out-of-support hypervisor#

According to IDC Frontier's own FAQ, last updated in July 2026, hosts in East Japan Regions 1 to 3 run VMware ESXi 6.7 or 8.0.3. VMware ended general support for ESXi 6.7 in October 2022, and all support in November 2023, according to Broadcom.

We do not know which version the four affected zones ran, whether IDC Frontier had any special support arrangement or other mitigations, or whether this played any part in the attack. IDC Frontier has not said how the attackers got in. But ESXi hypervisors are a common ransomware target, and running a version that no longer receives security patches in a service registered under ISMAP is a question its customers are entitled to ask.

Update, October 11: On the evening of October 11, IDC Frontier changed this FAQ. The page now shows an update time of 20:05 that day and says that, as of October 2026, all regions, including East Japan Regions 1 to 3, run ESXi 8.0.3. The note that upgrades were "in progress" has been removed. We saved the July version of the page on October 8, before the change. IDC Frontier has not explained the change, and the FAQ does not say when hosts were upgraded or how the four affected zones are treated. It still does not tell us which version those zones ran on October 7.

Update, October 27: The final report places the entry point in the portal's login system, not the hypervisor, and does not mention the ESXi version. Once inside, the attackers obtained administrator rights over the virtualization platform.

Suspending the console elsewhere#

Stopping the externally accessible management console for unaffected regions is a telling precaution. It suggests IDC Frontier is treating the management layer, not just the affected region, as a possible path for the attackers. That is our inference; the company has not said how the attackers got in. For customers in other regions, it means their systems may be running but they cannot manage them until the console returns. In the meantime, IDC Frontier says it is starting and stopping customers' virtual servers for them on request, a stopgap that, in our view, will be hard to sustain for long across hundreds of customers.

Update, October 14: The fifth report says the account details of 48 customers in the IDCF Cloud Portal, the web portal customers use to start servers and check bills, were improperly viewed. It does not say how, or whether this was the way in. Together with the attacker's message that IDC Frontier says appeared on the console (see The unverified details), it shows that the customer-facing management layer was reached, which makes the decision to suspend it everywhere easier to understand.

What this means for readers#

  • If you use the tesla, henry, pascal or joule zones, check whether you used the snapshot function: IDC Frontier is contacting the 194 customers whose snapshots can be retrieved. Otherwise, plan to rebuild from backups held outside those zones. IDC Frontier now says no data was taken, but keep in mind that this rests on finding no traces.
  • If IDC Frontier has told you your portal details were viewed, change your IDCF Cloud Portal password, and any other password that is the same, and watch the notification addresses for phishing.
  • If you use any other IDCF Cloud zone or region, follow IDC Frontier's request and take your own backup now, ideally outside IDCF Cloud. Expect the management console to stay unavailable for now.
  • If you use a service that stopped on October 7, check the provider's own notice before assuming the cause. Several unrelated outages were reported the same day.
  • If you have an Ekinet, Otona no Kyujitsu Club, View Card or JR Kyushu Web account, expect phishing emails that pretend to come from JR East, View Card or JR Kyushu. Do not follow links in unexpected emails; go to the official site or app directly.
  • If you shop at JR Central's or Takashimaya's online stores, be wary of emails that mention your orders or ask you to log in. Go to the official site directly.
  • If you booked a Peach flight, check your booking on Peach's website or app rather than relying on the itinerary email, and be wary of messages about flight changes or refunds that ask you to click a link or pay.
  • If your goods are stored with Nissui Logistics, contact the company about your inventory and plan alternative routes for time-sensitive deliveries.
  • If you run systems on any cloud, make sure at least one backup copy is outside your provider's reach, and test that you can restore from it.

Japanese terms at a glance#

Japanese Reading Meaning
IDCフロンティア Ai-dī-shī Furontia IDC Frontier Inc., SoftBank's data center and cloud subsidiary
東日本第1リージョン Higashi Nihon dai-ichi rījon East Japan Region 1
第三者からの不正アクセス daisansha kara no fusei akusesu Unauthorized access by a third party
障害 shōgai Outage, failure
ランサムウェア攻撃 ransamuwea kōgeki Ransomware attack
管理コンソール kanri konsōru Management console
仮想化基盤 kasōka kiban Virtualization platform
スナップショット sunappushotto Snapshot (point-in-time copy)
取り出しや復元が困難な見通し toridashi ya fukugen ga konnan na mitōshi Retrieval or restoration expected to be difficult
再構築 saikōchiku Rebuilding (a system)
メール配信用外部サービス mēru haishin-yō gaibu sābisu External email delivery service
不正な照会 fusei na shōkai Improper viewing (of records)
外部へのデータの流出はなかったと判断 gaibu e no dēta no ryūshutsu wa nakatta to handan Concluded that no data leaked outside
閲覧または取得された可能性を否定できない etsuran mata wa shutoku sareta kanōsei o hitei dekinai Cannot rule out that it was viewed or taken

This is a developing story. We will update this article as IDC Frontier and its customers publish more.